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█ Abstract Certain themes of L.A. Paul’s Transformative Experience are explored in the context of an ar-
gument with a vampire. The major disagreement is about the extent to which third-party data should in-
form our decisions as to whether to embark on a transformative experience. Three case-studies are ex-
plored: becoming a vampire, having a child, and eating durian. 
Keywords: Transformative Experience; Decision; Epistemologically Transformative Experience; Perso-
nally Transformative Experience 
 
█ Riassunto Discutendo con il vampiro – Affronterò alcuni aspetti del libro di L.A. Paul Transformative 
Experience nell’ambito di una discussione con un vampiro. Il punto di maggiore disaccordo verte sulla mi-
sura in cui fattori terzi dovrebbero informare le nostre decisioni in merito a un’esperienza trasformativa. 
Prenderò in considerazione tre casi: diventare vampiro, avere un figlio, mangiare il durian. 
Parole chiave: Esperienza trasformativa; Decisione; Esperienza epistemologicamente trasformativa; Espe-
rienza personalmente trasformativa 
 

I 
 
“A LOT OF PEOPLE BEG for this, you know,” 
she tells me. We are sitting in a bar in Singa-
pore. It is near midnight.  
I do know. Long before we became 
friends and she revealed her secret, I was well 
versed in vampire lore. I’ve read many of the 
books – my favorites are the Anne Rice nov-
els, especially Interview With a Vampire – 
and seen many of the movies and television 
shows. I recently learned from her that alt-
hough some of the stereotypes are wrong 
(vampires do show up in mirrors, and they 
cannot turn into bats), most are true. Pale 
skin, aversion to sunlight, preternatural 
strength, subsistence on blood, death from a 
stake through the heart, heightened sensual 
pleasure, near-immortality – all of that is real.  
It’s also true that vampires are not born 
that way. Vampires can choose to transform 
a normal human into one of them. All vam-
pires have this power, and so many mortals 
pester the vampires they are lucky enough to 
know, wanting to be turned, to be made into 
sexy, dangerous creatures of the night. 
But I’m not begging; I’m not even sure 
that I’m willing.  
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The benefits are undeniable. But I worry 
about giving up too much. Loss of contact 
with those I love. No more sunlight. Giving 
up my tenured position – unless I could 
somehow arrange to teach only at night and 
meet with my graduate students after sun-
down. Most of all, the blood. Biting people in 
the neck and drinking from them! 
The real problem here, I explain to the 
vampire, is that I can’t imagine what it would 
be like to be a vampire, so it’s very hard to 
decide. I explain how I’ve been influenced by 
the ideas of my friend, the philosopher Lau-
rie Paul, and especially her book Transforma-
tive Experience.1  
Paul argues that the usual way to make 
choices is by simulating their probable out-
comes, imagining what the experiences 
would be like and then assessing them to see 
how well they satisfy our desires. This is how 
one decides between ordering wine versus 
beer, or whether to take the day off and go to 
the beach. But Paul points out that are some 
experiences that can’t be simulated; you can’t 
imagine ahead of time what they are like. 
Such experiences are epistemologically trans-
formative – you have new information as the 
result of having them. Think of the first time 
you ate ice cream or had an orgasm or dove 
into cold water.  
Or think about becoming a vampire, 
which, coincidentally, is Paul’s first example in 
her book. She points out that you can’t know 
what it’s like to be a vampire without first be-
coming one.  
So I’m in a bind, I explain to my friend.  
“Yes, yes”, she responds. “But I can help. I 
was once human and, believe me, I’m so much 
better off now. Yes, sure, there’s stuff you 
miss. The hot sun on your face, the taste of 
real food. But it’s so extraordinary to experi-
ence the world as I do. It’s so blissful, so in-
tense. The heightened senses, the thrill of the 
hunt, the power. And I know you personally. I 
know what you like, the kind of person you 
are – please trust me, you would be so happy.” 
I don’t respond and she adds: “It’s not just 
me, you know. Every vampire I’ve talked to – 
hundreds by now – says exactly the same 
thing. None of us have any regrets.” 
I’m still quiet, and she finally says: “Do 
you think I’m lying?” 
Not at all, I tell her. But Paul has con-
vinced me that, unlike an experience such as 
eating ice cream, becoming a vampire isn’t 
just epistemologically transformative; it’s al-
so personally transformative. It changes the 
kind of person you are. In this regard, it’s 
similar to other significant experiences, such 
as going to war or joining a cult. And this in-
fluences how I respond to testimony of the 
sort my friend is giving me.  
I pick up my phone, open up the Kindle 
app, and read some of Paul’s book:  
 
A radically new experience can funda-
mentally change your own point of view 
so much and so deeply that, before you’ve 
had that experience, you can’t know what 
it is going to be like to be you after the 
experience. It changes your subjective 
value of what it is like to be you, and 
changes your preferences about what 
matters.2 
 
And then I move to a pair of passages that 
are especially relevant to the offer I’m now 
considering.  
 
[…] it seems awfully suspect to rely solely 
on the testimony of your vampire friends 
to make your choice, because, after all, 
they aren’t human any more, so their 
preferences are the ones vampires have, 
not the ones humans have.3 
 
Your effort to evaluate testimony is com-
plicated by the fact that even people who 
seemed quite anti-vampire beforehand 
can change their minds after being bitten, 
suggesting that some sort of deep prefer-
ence change is indeed occurring. Alt-
hough your friends, as vampires, report 
that they are happy with their new exist-
ence, it isn’t clear that their pre-vampire 
selves would have been happy with the 
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change. For example, your once-vegeta-
rian neighbor who practiced Buddhism 
and an esoteric variety of hot yoga now 
says that since being bitten (as it happens, 
against her will), she too loves being a 
vampire … Maybe something about be-
coming a vampire changes people in a 
way so that, now, as vampires, they love 
being vampires.4 
 
I elaborate: You see, right now I would 
hate drinking blood. But if were to become a 
vampire, my preferences would change and 
then I’d love drinking blood. But I don’t want 
to love drinking blood. It’s like the line by the 
attorney Clarence Darrow: “I don’t like spin-
ach, and I’m glad I don’t, because if I liked it, 
I’d eat it, and I just hate it”.  
“You know that the Darrow line is a joke, 
right?”, says my friend. “If he came to like 
spinach, he’d enjoy eating it. Maybe he has 
some other reason not to want to like spinach 
in the future, but intense dislike right now 
doesn’t qualify.” 
I begin to speak, and she holds up her 
hand:  
“You don’t like jazz, right? Right now, you 
wouldn’t choose to listen to jazz?” 
That’s right, I agree cautiously.  
“What if you had the chance to take a jazz 
appreciation course, and if you took the 
course, you would end up loving it. Would 
you refuse to take the course, on the grounds 
that it will change your preferences?” She im-
itates me: “I don’t want to like jazz in the fu-
ture because I don’t like it now”. 
I tell her that this is unfair. In this jazz ex-
ample, I’m choosing ahead of time to adopt this 
different preference, so maybe I have a meta-
preference where I want to want to like jazz. 
She cuts me off, “Stop. Preferences change 
all the time. You get used to your environ-
ment, so soon your small and smelly apart-
ment doesn’t bother you anymore. Or you 
get bored with a song and don’t want to hear 
it ever again. Young children find kissing 
gross and then puberty hits. You get old and 
then, one day, playing bridge seems like a 
perfect way to spend an evening.” 
“A lot of these preferences choices are in-
voluntary, but some of them are under your 
control. Shouldn’t you want to make choices 
that will make you happy in the future? If all 
they are going to serve on your week-long 
cruise is spinach, isn’t a good thing to start 
liking it? Other things being equal, isn’t more 
happiness better than less?” 
I hesitate. Well, ok, yes. But maybe after a 
transformation as radical as becoming a 
vampire, I’m no longer the same person. 
There are concerns about personal... 
She interrupts again, “I know psycholo-
gists often get confused about personal iden-
tity5 but this is just a red herring. Of course, 
I’ve changed a lot since becoming a vampire; 
there have been big-time changes in my qual-
itative identity. In some metaphorical sense, 
I’m ‘a different person’. But I’m still me. Be-
coming a vampire is something that hap-
pened to me. It’s not like one person died, 
and another one popped into being. Certain-
ly, Laurie Paul understands this; it looks like 
her whole book is about people’s ability to 
choose their futures wisely in cases where 
they are not able to simulate them. It’s about 
transformation, not obliteration.”  
“And anyway,” she adds with a smirk, “if 
you didn’t believe it would still be you once 
you became a vampire, you wouldn’t worry so 
much about what it’s like for you to be one.” 
Yes, I concede, I’ll be the same person af-
ter becoming a vampire. And it does seem, 
based on the evidence, that I will be happier 
person. If I were a hedonist, this would be a 
no-brainer. But there are moral concerns. 
Drinking blood isn’t quite the same as devel-
oping a taste for spinach. 
Maybe there’s no reason why past prefer-
ences should take priority over future ones.6 
But there’s no contradiction in saying: Right 
now I don’t think drinking blood is ok, and I 
don’t want to change, because if I thought it 
was ok, I would do it, and I don’t want to do 
it because it’s wrong. (If you don’t like this 
example, surely you would agree that I 
should very much not want to adopt the view 
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that molesting children is just fine.) More 
generally, if you think your moral views are 
correct, you shouldn’t want them to change. 
Anyhow, I’m not sure I want to give up 
what I know now – which is that it’s really 
wrong to treat people as food – and replace it 
with the messed-up morality of a vampire.   
We stare at each other.  
“Is that it?”, she says.  
Well, there’s one more thing. Maybe I 
would like to have children. Vampires can’t 
do that.  
She rolls her eyes. “Why in the world 
would you would ever want to have chil-
dren?” 
 
II 
 
That’s a good question, I say. Having 
children is another example Laurie Paul 
gives. She suggests that it is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to imagine what it’s like to have a 
young child if you don’t already have one.  
“Makes sense,”, my friend says. “But, un-
like the vampire case, I’m sure that there’s a 
lot of social science here.”  
There is, I agree. The study that everyone 
cites is by Daniel Kahneman and Angus Dea-
ton, where a sample of about 900 employed 
women were asked, at the end of each day, to 
recall each of their activities and describe 
how happy they were when they did them.7 It 
turns out that they judge being with their 
children as less enjoyable than many other 
activities, such as watching TV, shopping, or 
preparing food. Other studies find that when 
a child is born, there is a decrease in happi-
ness for parents that doesn’t go away for a 
long time8, along with a corresponding drop 
in satisfaction⁠ with the marriage that only 
goes away once the kids leave the house.9 
None of this should be surprising. Having 
children, and particularly young children, 
leads to financial struggle, sleep deprivation, 
loss of enjoyable activities, and, for women, 
the physical strain of pregnancy and, in some 
cases, breastfeeding. And children can turn a 
happy and loving marital relationship into a 
zero-sum battle over who gets to sleep and 
rest and who doesn’t. Children provoke a 
couple’s most frequent arguments – more 
than money, more than work, more than in-
laws, more than sex, more than anything.10 
“Sounds like a nightmare,” she agrees. 
“So, just to put this back on the table, here is 
what I’d have to do to you to transform you 
into a vampire. It’s just like in the Anne Rice 
novels except that …” 
But wait, I go on. There are other studies 
that present a different picture. It turns out 
that this happiness hit is worse for some peo-
ple than others.11 Somewhat older fathers ac-
tually get a happiness boost, while it’s young 
parents and single parents, male and female, 
that suffer a happiness loss. Also, most of the 
original data was from the United States. A 
recent⁠ paper looked at the happiness levels 
of people with and without children in 22 
countries. They found that the extent to 
which children make you happy is influenced 
by whether there are childcare policies such 
as paid parental leave12. Parents from Nor-
way and Hungary, for instance, are happier 
than childless couples – while parents from 
Australia and Great Britain are less happy. 
The country with the greatest happiness 
drop when you have children? The United 
States.  
It’s not just who you are and where you 
are; it’s what you want. When you stop ask-
ing about happiness and satisfaction and in-
stead ask people questions like “In the bigger 
picture of your life, how personally signifi-
cant and meaningful to you is what you are 
doing at the moment?”, parents claim to have 
more meaning in their lives than non-
parents.13 Other research finds that the more 
time people spent taking care of children, the 
more meaningful they said that their lives 
were – though they reported that their lives 
were no happier.14 These data might really 
sway someone looking for meaning in life.  
“It would be useful”, my vampire friend 
said, “to find the best data on just people like 
you, looking at just what you value. That 
would tell you whether or not to have a child.” 
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But that data might not be enough, I say. I 
take out my phone again, and start to read 
more from Transformative Experience.  
 
[…] You can replace your personal ap-
proach to decision-making with imper-
sonal decision-making, removing any cru-
cial role for your experience or your indi-
vidual, personal perspective when you de-
liberate.  
 
But changing the decision this way gives 
an unsatisfying answer to the question of 
how you should make these deeply per-
sonal, centrally important, life-changing 
decisions. For after all, your decision con-
cerns your personal future, and so an es-
sential part of your decision is based on 
what it would be like for you to have the 
experience and to live the life you bring 
about for yourself. You naturally and in-
tuitively want to make your life choices by 
thinking about what you care about and 
what your future experience will be like if 
you decide to undergo the experience. 
This is why you are expected to weigh ev-
idence from your own personal perspec-
tive and decide how you want to apply it 
to your own situation.15 
 
In another discussion, Paul gives the ex-
ample of Sally, who decides not to have a 
child because of the data, and says:  
 
For her to choose this way, ignoring her 
subjective preferences and relying solely 
on external reasons, seems bizarre. … If 
Sally, in effect, turns her decision over to 
the experts and eliminates consideration 
of her personal preferences, she seems to 
be giving up her autonomy for the sake of 
rationality.16 
 
My vampire friend interrupts me at this 
point.  
“Wait. I can see that the relevant findings 
might not exist, or not be trustworthy. But is 
Paul saying that even if the data are good, 
there’s something wrong with relying on it?” 
I nod.  
“Then I just don’t get it.17 Suppose you 
want to sun yourself at the beach – for one 
last time, if you take my offer – and think the 
weather looks fine. But you turn on the 
Weather Channel and it says it will rain. You 
stay home, because you think the Weather 
Channel is pretty accurate. What’s wrong 
with that? How did you lose any of your pre-
cious autonomy?” 
This isn’t a fair example, I respond. When 
I’m looking at the Weather Channel, I’m us-
ing external information to learn about cir-
cumstances, not how I would react to these 
circumstances.  
“Ok, so take something very experiential, 
from my pre-vampire days. I’ve read books 
and spoke to people who described their LSD 
experiences very positively, and this got me 
interested and I decided to indulge. Similar 
positive testimony motivated me to try regu-
lar meditation. On the other hand, I’ve heard 
enough bad stories about heroin that I gave 
that one a pass. This all seems totally rational 
to me, and perfectly autonomous”. 
“Or take Sally. Of course, Sally might be 
mistaken in trusting the data. Maybe the re-
search is done poorly – given the replication 
crisis, someone should be very cautious be-
fore giving too much weight to the findings 
from a couple of studies. Also, happiness data 
only matter if Sally cares about happiness 
and meaningfulness data only matter if she 
cares about meaning. If Sally’s preference is 
to have a child, regardless of whether or not 
it makes her happy and regardless of whether 
it would add to her sense of having meaning 
in her life, then it would be silly for her to 
even look at the research”. 
“But let’s suppose she wants to have a hap-
py life, and has evidence that having a child 
doesn’t make people happy, it makes them 
miserable, then she shouldn’t have a child”. 
I shake my head and quote Paul again, re-
sponding to just this argument.  
 
Suppose that Sally wants to be happy, but 
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that she is confident that she’ll only be 
happy if she becomes a mother. Then she 
sees a lot of empirical data that having 
children makes people unhappy. What 
should she do?  
Here the strategy of ignoring her own in-
trospective evidence is a lot less straight-
forward. This is because the empirical da-
ta doesn’t give Sally evidence that having 
a child would make her sad. It gives her 
evidence of what the average association 
between happiness and having a child has 
been for other people.18 
 
“Hold it”, my friend interrupts. “Are you 
saying that Sally should discount information 
about other people just because it isn’t specif-
ic to her? Really? If you heard that Sally was 
suffering from a severe infection but had no 
plans to take antibiotics – because everything 
Sally knows about the efficacy of antibiotics 
comes from other people – you would think 
she was nuts. Sally is a person, after all, and 
so data from other people are relevant to her. 
When Sally took biology as a kid, did she say: 
Well, none of this stuff is relevant to my 
body, because they never studied me? Of 
course, she didn’t.” 
 “Well, the same thing is true about her 
experiences. Suppose Sally has her heart set 
on a certain beach resort, goes to a review 
website, and discovers that it has a one-star 
rating, with hundreds of reviewers describing 
it as the worst experience of their lives. 
Would Sally really conclude that these are da-
ta about the association between visiting the 
resort and happiness for other people, and 
hence they don’t speak to what her own ex-
perience would be like?” 
“I know that I’m moving away from 
transformative experiences here, but the 
same point applies even more for them. You 
should be especially sensitive to third-party 
data for transformative experience because 
your introspection and simulation can’t do 
the trick”.  
Paul disagrees, I say. The inability to sim-
ulate the experience is a real problem with 
transformative experience, because this sort 
of simulation is what should matter. Here’s 
Paul on this:  
 
So when I consider the major, irreversible, 
long-term and life-changing decision to 
have a baby, of course I should weigh 
what other people tell me about it, and I 
should also attend to what the best sci-
ence says. But I also want to consider 
what I think it will be like for me. After 
all, I’m the one who will be spending the 
next 18 years raising my child. I want to 
base my decision, at least partly, on what I 
think it will be like to be a parent, and I 
want my thoughts and feelings about it to 
play a central role in what I decide to do. 
If becoming a parent is transformative, I 
can’t rationally do that.19 
 
“Well,” says my friend, “Paul is certainly 
right that the important question for some-
one thinking of having a child is what it will 
be like for them, not for other people. But 
what if it turns out that your own introspec-
tion is a poor way of predicting your own fu-
ture? What if it turns out that data from oth-
er people who have had the experience are 
actually more informative about what it 
would be like for you? 
“Well, crack a psychology textbook, bud-
dy, because that’s exactly what the situation 
seems to be. Our introspection about what 
makes us happy is famously flawed.20 Just as 
one standard example, people tend to over-
value the hedonic effects of big houses and 
fancy cars and undervalue the pleasures of 
new experiences and new people. 
But there is a better way, summed up by 
Dan Gilbert: When trying to figure out what 
makes you happier, don’t trust your gut; 
check out the data. See what the experience is 
like for others. He quotes the 17th century 
writer François de La Rochefoucauld: ‘Before 
we set our hearts too much upon anything, 
let us first examine how happy those are who 
already possess it’”.21 
I start to respond, but she is restless and 
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nods towards the door.  
 
III 
 
I pay for my beer and then we walk, my 
vampire friend and I, towards a night mar-
ket. She wears a dark cloak, and glides 
through the crowds like a wraith. The hu-
midity doesn’t bother her; she never sweats.   
And then we find ourselves in front of a 
durian stand.  
“Are you hungry?”, she asks. Of course, 
she herself would not and could not indulge.  
Well, I’ve never had durian, I explain. If it 
were pineapple, then it would be easy. I know 
what pineapple tastes like. I can simulate it. 
But to eat a durian would be … 
“A transformative experience,” she sighs.  
Yes, exactly! An epistemological one. And 
so there no rational way to decide. 
“Wait,” she says. “Just wait. I accept your 
point about vampires, your moral concerns.” 
She doesn’t hide her distain. “But what the 
hell is the problem with durian? If you want 
to know how it tastes, just ask someone. 
Have you never tried a new food?” 
Well, there’s a special problem with duri-
an. There’s no consensus here. I point her to 
a website on the topic.22 One 17th century 
missionary wrote, “The flesh is as white as 
snow, exceeds in delicacy of taste of all our 
best European fruits, and none of ours can 
approach it.” Good, eh? Others, though, have 
described it as a tasting of “used surgical 
swabs” and “a bunch of dead cats”. Ugh. So 
it’s a tough choice. 
I think for a while, and then walk to an-
other stand and buy a Snickers bar.  
“You’re risk averse,” she notes. “Not your 
best feature.” 
We walk.  
She starts again: “I think you fetishize 
simulation.” 
“Imagine a long-married couple at a fa-
vorite restaurant staring at their menus. The 
man says he’s going to order the Porterhouse 
steak. And his wife sighs, says he always or-
ders the Porterhouse, never likes it, com-
plains that they always overcook it, and ends 
up eating half of her salmon, which he finds 
delicious. The man remembers none of this; 
he just has a real hankering for steak; it 
seems like just the thing when he’s hungry. 
His wife tells him that he always says that. 
He concluded that he’s sometimes wrong, he 
has a poor memory for the taste of food, and 
often his wife knows him better than he does. 
He orders the salmon. And he loves it.” 
“What’s so weird about this? What did he 
lose?” 
That’s a small choice, I say quietly. Auton-
omy isn’t such a big deal for small choices. But 
let’s go back to what Laurie Paul said about Sal-
ly and how deferring to others for a choice like 
whether or not to have a child is “giving up her 
autonomy for the sake of rationality”. This 
makes sense to me.23 Sometimes we want to be 
authentic and autonomous beings, and for this, 
choice is important.  
Here’s an example from the philosopher 
Kieran Setiya.24 Suppose you have a choice 
between A, B, and C, and you prefer A to B 
and B to C. Now imagine that you also value 
having a choice. This might put you in the 
position of preferring the opportunity to 
choose between B and C to simply getting A, 
even though you know that A is better than 
either alternative. Now, to be fair, Setiya 
thinks this is absurd. But I’m not so sure.  
“We’re not talking about choice here,” she 
snaps. “We’re talking about data. The man in 
the restaurant can still choose. Sally can still 
choose. They have their precious autonomy. 
The question is what they base their choice 
on. Their unreliable gut feelings? Or some-
thing that’s actually reliable?” 
I tell her that there is something wrong 
about going against your gut feelings.  
Now she’s really annoyed: “Sally is like 
someone who thinks homosexuality is wrong, 
and when you ask her to defend her view, she 
says it just feels wrong; gay people disgust 
her. And when you press her, she says: well, 
you have to respect my heartfelt feelings on 
this matter. They’re authentic, she tells you. 
She’s like someone who won’t go on planes 
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because she worries that they will crash, and 
when you tell her that it’s safer to fly than to 
drive, she tells you she doesn’t care about sta-
tistics, she prefers to listen to her heart. And 
we’re supposed to respect that?” 
She glares at me: “Would you rather feel 
good about the dumb-ass way you make de-
cisions? Or would you actually make good de-
cisions?” 
We walk some more, not speaking, cut-
ting through a secluded alley, and I start to 
feel anxious about how this night will end.  
“I won’t transform you against your will, 
you know”, she says, and I remember that 
one of the powers that vampires are said to 
have is telepathy.  
“Though,” she adds, “If I did, you would 
thank me for it later.” And she looks at my 
face, and then laughs and punches me in the 
arm.  “Kidding”, she says.  
 
IV 
 
You know, I tell her, I really have been 
thinking of her offer. Maybe I’ve been look-
ing at things the wrong way.  
I tell her about another example by Seti-
ya.25 It’s based on a scenario by Derek Parfit, 
but he takes it in a different direction. Setiya 
asks you to imagine that if you and your 
partner were to conceive a child during a cer-
tain period, the child would have some seri-
ous problem, such as chronic joint pain, say. 
If you just wait a week, the child will grow up 
to be fine.  
But for whatever reason, you choose not 
to wait, and now you have a son. And he 
grows up and, though he suffers, he is happy 
to be alive. And like a lot of parents, you love 
him and he grows to be adult and you’re 
thrilled that you decided to have him. 
Do you regret your decision? Well, yes, in 
a sense. You’re no dummy. You have to con-
cede that, on average, it’s better to have a 
child without this condition, better for him 
and better for you. But then again, if you 
waited, you’d have a different child. The per-
son you love wouldn’t exist. So it’s hard to see 
your decision as a mistake.  
“That sounds like a paradox,” she says 
slowly. “You’re in a situation where the deci-
sion you made turns out to be the best one, 
even though, when you look at another way, 
you concede it’s the worst one.” 
It’s a problem for decision theory, I agree. 
The standard model is that you make deci-
sions by assessing the options and choosing 
the best one. But it turns out that an option 
can change its value by the act of choosing it. 
It’s not just whether or not to have children; 
it shows up for all sorts of significant choic-
es.26 
“I guess this is reassuring,” she says. “Even 
if things turn out badly, in some objective 
sense, so that you would have been happier if 
you didn’t choose to have a certain experi-
ence, you might still think you did the right 
thing. And my bet is that the same compen-
satory mechanisms of satisfaction don’t ap-
ply if you just do nothing. You justify your 
actions, not your failures to act.” 
She concludes, “And this is a good argu-
ment for saying yes to transformative experi-
ences. Even if they’re wrong, they can turn 
out right.” 
I nod. There’s a recent study done by Ste-
ven Levitt, I tell her, that’s very interesting.27 
It was done on a website. People who visited 
the site were asked to think about something 
really important that they were on the fence 
about, and then they got to flip a virtual coin. 
If it was heads, people were instructed to go 
ahead and make the change; if it was tails, 
they didn’t. And some of these changes were 
big. Deciding to open a business, quit their 
job, break up with their partner. Who knows, 
maybe some of these choices involved trans-
formative experiences. 
The website was left open for a year, and 
there were more than 20,000 coin flips. After 
the flip, for each person, there were two 
email follow-ups, one two months after the 
flip, the other six months after the flip. And 
they found that those who made a major 
change were more likely to report being hap-
pier two months later, and even happier six 
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months later. There was no such effect for 
the small decisions.  
Now I find this really interesting but if 
this was it, it wouldn’t show that making a 
choice actually had a positive effect. After all, 
the sort of person who is on the fence about 
getting divorced and then gets divorced 
might be more divorce-inclined than the sort 
of person who is on the fence about getting 
divorced and then decides not to. And the 
divorce-inclined might be happier post-
divorce than the less divorce-inclined.  
But cool thing is that Levitt also found 
that the flip mattered: Those who got heads 
were both more likely to make the change 
and reported greater happiness in their fu-
ture than those who got tails.   
And this suggests, I concluded, that when 
you’re wondering about whether to make a 
big change in your life and you’re on the 
fence, you are better off saying yes.  
She smiles. “So,” she asks me for the last 
time, “Want to become a vampire?”. 
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